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Capital, an Elusive Tax Object and Impediment to Sustainable Taxation 
By 
Henry Ordower, Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law 
A well-functioning tax system is critical to a well-functioning society but a tax system cannot 
operate efficiently if it is unfair.  Any tax system that does not distribute its burdens fairly will 
have hostility rather than support from its taxpayers.    Complexity, opportunities for some to 
capture unintended tax benefits and perceptions that tax distribution is not even-handed 
contribute to dissatisfaction with taxes and active tax avoidance and evasion.1  Avoidance and 
evasion threaten tax systems.  Constant change to control the threat characterizes many existing 
systems.  Much of the threat comes from the affluent.  Affluent members of the society have the 
mobility to take their capital and go elsewhere depriving their home country of capital resources.  
They demand decrease in tax on capital as taxes on less mobile labor must increase to make up 
the shortfall. 
Sustainable taxation requires stability and predictability.  Sustainable taxation is a tax or taxes 
that collect sufficient revenue to support the governmental goods and services the society needs 
and wants.  The taxes must provide for 1) even-handedness -- something akin to horizontal 
equity,2 2) distributional fairness -- a concept emerging from notions of vertical equity,3 3) 
transparency in application so that the populace understands and accepts the tax and the need for 
it and 4) collection mechanisms that do not favor some societal groups, especially those with 
resources to secure creative tax advisors, over others who lack the resources.  Narrow base taxes 
– fuel, alcohol, tobacco -- cannot meet these criteria and the broad base taxes currently 
applicable – value added, payroll and income – also fail to meet one or more of the criteria.  
While specialized taxes like environmental taxes and sin taxes (alcohol, tobacco) serve useful 
regulatory functions and may achieve their behavioral objectives in part, they do so primarily by 
increasing the cost of engaging in the undesirable behavior and pricing some actors out of the 
activity.  Using a pricing rather than a direct regulatory mechanism, the specialized taxes change 
the conversation from social rejection of the behavior to acceptance as long as the actor is willing 
and able to pay the high price. Is it all right to pollute if one pays to do so?4  Direct regulation 
might prove less regressive and less likely to be viewed as simply a matter of price and more as a 
matter of societal mainstream and commitment to addressing a problem. 
1 Henry Ordower, The Culture of Tax Avoidance, 55 Saint Louis U. L. J. 47 (2010) (arguing that tax avoidance is 
embedded into modern cultures). 
2 Compare the formulation of this requirement the German Constitutional Court adopted with respect to the German 
income tax:  “taxpayers who have the same ability to pay should be taxed equally (horizontal equity), while (in the 
vertical direction) taxation of higher incomes should be measured against the taxation of lower incomes.”  BVerfGE 
107, 27 at 46 (Dec. 4, 2002) (author’s translation as in Henry Ordower, Horizontal and Vertical Equity in Taxation 
as Constitutional Principles:  Germany and the United States Contrasted, 7 Fla. Tax Rev. 259, 302 (2006)). 
3 Id.  
4 Consider carbon offsets that might make one feel more comfortable with the personal choice to travel by air. 
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To secure sustainable taxation this paper recommends a non-preferential income tax on a 
comprehensive income tax base.  While by no means a new idea,5  the growing resource 
disparity between affluent individuals and individuals with limited resources renders the idea of 
a non-preferential income tax on all income including realized and unrealized gains all the more 
compelling. The paper outlines a method for transition to the recommended tax base from the 
current realization-based tax base and suggests that in limited cases a taxpayer might defer 
payment of tax on some items of income but not defer inclusion of the items in the tax base.  As 
it describes its tax plan, the paper reflects on the objectives and shortcomings of the targeted 
taxes and purposive tax base modifications that have proliferated during the 20th century.  The 
paper concludes that a non-comprehensive tax base may accomplish narrow objectives 
successfully but is unlikely to become functionally sustainable to support essential governmental 
goods and services.6  Neither are targeted taxes and purposive tax base modifications fully 
justifiable.  They are likely to distribute tax burdens unevenly among taxpayers without any 
compelling reason for preferring some taxpayers to others.  The narrowness of the base of such 
taxes frequently leads to regressive tax incidence.  
Some taxes serve a predominantly political objective, others a behavioral one.  Their 
proliferation may target narrow, albeit pressing, issues such as environmental degradation;7
others may support targeted economic development.8  Yet, even carefully crafted, socially 
desirable and focused tax choices distract and occasionally misdirect political and social 
attention from more durable solutions that may lead to long necessary, broad and sustainable tax 
reform.  Beneficent tax provisions targeting critical issues often burden those with limited 
resources disproportionally relative to the burden on those with greater resources.  Even when 
Congress chose to make healthcare insurance a substantially universal requirement in the U.S., it 
used the tax infrastructure to support that requirement.  Individuals who fail to buy health 
insurance must make a shared responsibility payment collected through the income tax but not 
enforced with penalties for failure to file or pay.9  In National Federation of Independent 
5 Henry C. Simons, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION:  THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY at 
50 (Chicago, 1938) defines income for purposes of the income tax base as:  “the algebraic sum of (1) the market 
value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between 
the beginning and end of the period in question.”
6 The paper will not try to define essential governmental goods and services, but, at a minimum, military, fire and 
police protection, courts and a legislature would fall into that category. 
7 Ian Parry: Why A Carbon Tax Makes Sense, IMF (2019), available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2019/12/the-case-for-carbon-taxation-and-putting-a-price-on-pollution-
parry.htm
8 Opportunity zones, for example.  Section §1400Z of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code”), 
Title 26 of the U.S. Code (deferring taxation of capital gain when gain is invested in an qualified opportunity fund  
and eliminating capital gain on appreciation of the opportunity fund investment).  This article refers to provisions of 
the Code by section number as “I.R.C. §” followed by a number.  The Code and I.R.C. § also refers to provisions of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, the predecessor to the 1986 codification of the U.S. tax laws. 
9 Section §5000A  (requiring a payment collected through the income tax infrastructure but amended in 2017 to set 
the payment amount at zero).  This article refers to provisions of the Code by section number as “I.R.C. §” followed 
by a number.  The Code and I.R.C. § also refers to provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, 
the predecessor to the 1986 codification of the U.S. tax laws. 
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Business v. Sebelius10 the U.S. Supreme Court held the Affordable Care Act to be constitutional 
and the payment supporting the healthcare mandate to be a tax despite it applying narrowly only 
to those individuals without health insurance.  The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 reduced the 
amount of the payment to zero leaving the tax infrastructure in place but gutting any impact of 
the payment.11
As a result targeted taxes undercut their own benefits by violating equality principles as they 
become regressive relative to resources. Despite their virtues, such targeted taxes tend to be 
unsustainable as a solution even to the narrow problem they address.  Often such taxes are used 
as a proxy for something else – environmental regulation, for example -- without being the most 
direct and certain way to deal with that something else. 
Part I of this paper sorts taxes by their objectives, examining how well or poorly they serve their 
objective as the paper reviews the incidence of the taxes.  Part II addresses the legislative 
addiction to using the tax infrastructure and complexity.  Part III considers broad tax bases and 
observes the shortcomings of existing broad bases in the context of providing sustainability for 
taxes.  Part IV focuses on favored capital under the income tax and the manner in which the 
income tax disfavors labor as capital income and labor income have split and continue to 
separate creating into a dual income tax.12  Part V concludes by recommending a sustainable and 
transparent income tax that neither perpetuates societal disparities between affluent and non-
affluent individuals nor limits the ability of those without capital to accumulate tax favored 
capital.   
Part I.  Tax sorting and sustainability.  While taxes serve primarily to fund public goods and 
services, legislatures often use taxes to serve other functions as well.  Sometimes those other 
functions are free from revenue production goals.  Tax systems in developed economies have 
substantial administrative infrastructures.  Rather than creating a new administrative 
infrastructure to regulate an activity, legislatures may and often do rely instead on the existing 
tax infrastructure as they regulate or extend subsidies to activities.  To fit the regulation or 
subsidy into an existing tax system, the tax infrastructure may permit the capture of a tax subsidy 
or avoidance of tax burden by unintended taxpayers.  Many examples of this phenomenon exist. 
The longstanding example of tax exempt bonds described in the next paragraph illustrates the 
point.   
10 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (holding the Affordable Care Act constitutional).  Recently, a lower court decision ruled the 
Affordable Care Act unconstitutional after the reduction of the shared responsibility payment to zero eliminating the 
healthcare insurance mandate.  Abby Goodnough and Robert Pear, Texas Judge Strikes Down Obama’s Affordable 
Care Act as Unconstitutional, The New York Times (December 14, 2018), available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/14/health/obamacare-unconstitutional-texas-judge.html.
11 Section 11081 of Pub. L. 115–97 (Dec. 22, 2017) amended subsection (c) of I.R.C. §5000A to set the applicable 
dollar amount at zero.  Pub. L. 115–97 is an unnamed tax act commonly referred to as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 
2017 (TCJA).   
12 Edward D. Kleinbard, An American Dual Income Tax: Nordic Precedents, 5 Northwestern Journal of Law and 
Social Policy 41 (2010). 
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Tax Subsidies.  The U.S. subsidizes the borrowing cost of state and local governmental units by 
excluding the interest that is paid from the recipient’s income.13  This exclusion from taxation 
permits the governmental unit to borrow at a rate lower than it would pay if the interest it paid 
were fully taxable to the recipient.  While some doubt existed historically as to whether the U.S. 
constitutionally could tax the interest, the decision in South Carolina v. Baker14 dispelled any 
such lingering doubts.  Assuming, for example, that the market interest rate were ten percent and 
the maximum income tax rate were 30 percent, the state interest rate should be 7 percent so that 
the state captures the tax subsidy from the gross income exclusion.  States rarely can find 
sufficient buyers for their debt who are 30 percent bracket taxpayers so they must offer a higher 
interest rate to attract lower bracket taxpayers.  If the state may sell all its debt if it targets 20 
percent bracket taxpayers, the interest rate it will pay to make the exempt interest comparable to 
the 10 percent market rate is 8 percent.  Nothing prevents a lender who does pay the maximum 
rate of 30 percent from buying the 8 percent debt and receiving the equivalent of an above 
market rate of 11.43 percent.  That high bracket taxpayer/lender captures part of the federal 
subsidy directed to the state.  The U.S. cannot shift the excess tax saving to the state as a subsidy.  
Instead it is a deadweight loss that does nothing to advance the U.S. goal of subsidizing states’ 
borrowing costs.  A direct subsidy of an interest rate differential would be more efficient and 
would not enhance the resources of wealthier taxpayers who otherwise are taxable at the highest 
marginal rates of tax. 
An income tax might have a primarily revenue raising function but the legislature often deploys 
deductions and exclusions from the income tax base to stimulate the economy rather than 
providing direct subsidies that would require their own administrative infrastructure.  A simple 
example is the depreciation deduction.15  A deduction for gradual consumption of durable 
property used to produce income makes sense where the goal of the income tax is to tax only the 
taxpayer’s net income.  Consumption of the durable property is one of the costs of producing the 
income.  Determining how much of the durable property is consumed as income is produced 
always has been challenging. Mismatching of allowance and economic consumption has been 
common and a source of disagreement between the taxpayer and tax collector.  In 1981, 
Congress stabilized the depreciation allowance system in the U.S. by introducing determinable 
useful lives and allowable methods of depreciation and by eliminating salvage value when it 
introduced the accelerated cost recovery system (ACRS).16  The depreciation system abandoned 
the notion of accurately matching income and expenditure.  It substituted a system providing 
economic stimulus rather measuring net income.   
13 I.R.C. §103 (excluding interest on state and local obligations from the gross income of the recipients).   
14 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (holding U.S. may tax interest on state or local obligation not issued in registered form). 
15 I.R.C. §§ 167 and 168. 
16 I.R.C. §168, added by the Economic Recovery Act of 1981, P.L. 97-34 (August 13, 1981) Section 201. 
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In a graduated income tax, deductions17 like ACRS and exclusions like state and local interest 
payments benefit higher marginal bracket and generally wealthier taxpayers more than lower 
bracket taxpayers.  Since adoption of the accelerated cost recovery system of depreciation in 
1981, Congress has modified useful lives and permissible methods on several occasions, each 
time causing market disruptions as the changed methods affect the initial and resale values of the 
underlying durable goods.  Shortened lives and acceleration increase value, lengthened lives and 
retarded recovery decreases values because of the time value of the deduction.  Repeated 
revisions of tax provisions affecting property values do not contribute to a predictable and 
sustainable system as each modification produces extra-market winners and losers.  While 
changes in direct subsidies might do so as well, they are likely to target a specific industry.  Such 
a targeted subsidy is subject to greater public scrutiny than is a general tax change and is more 
likely to benefit its target only without providing broader opportunities for tax planners to seize 
the benefit for non-targeted taxpayers.  
Non-Revenue/Subsidy Functions.  Taxes also may serve a primarily non-tax function.  Until the 
beginning of the 20th century when the income tax amendment to the U.S. Constitution18
permitted a direct income tax without apportionment, tariffs were the principal revenue source 
for the federal government.19  While tariffs historically served the function of protecting 
American industry by levelling prices for U.S. manufactured goods with the prices that other 
countries with lower production costs might offer for comparable goods or making them more 
expensive than domestic goods, revenue production often was at least an equally important 
function of the tariffs.  Import duties20 have begun again to flourish in the U.S., but currently, 
rather than a primary or even comparable revenue producing function, new tariffs have been 
deployed politically to support American demands for trade concessions from the U.S.’s trading 
partners.  
During the latter decades of the 20th century, legislatures increasingly relied on existing tax 
infrastructures to address issues that are not fundamentally tax or revenue issues.  Legislatures 
designed some taxes to discourage bad behaviors or encourage good behaviors and other taxes 
17 New I.R.C. §199A providing a 20 percent deduction for qualified business income may alter this observation in 
some instances, see infra note  85 and accompanying text. 
18 U.S. Constitution Amendment XVI (1913) (federal income tax without apportionment otherwise required by U.S. 
Const. Art. I, section 2, para. 3 permitted.) 
19 In many of the years before 1913, tariffs generated nearly 100 percent of federal revenue.  Bureau of the Census, 
Bicentennial Edition: Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Series Y 352-357, Federal 
Government Receipts: 1789-1939 at 1106 (available at 
http://www2.census.gov/library/publications/1975/compendia/hist_stats_colonial-1970/hist_stats_colonial-1970p2-
chY.pdf).  Text from footnote 32 in Henry Ordower, Taxing Others in the Age of Trump:  Foreigners (and the 
Politically Weak) as Tax Subjects, 62 Saint Louis University L.J. 157, 162 (2017). 
20 In the U.S. the provisions governing customs duties are in 19 U.S. Code while most other federal taxes appear in, 
the Internal Revenue  Despite separate codification, customs duties are considered to be taxes on the import of raw 
materials and goods.  Webster’ New World Dictionary, College Ed.  454 (New York, 1960).   Tariffs are taxes or 
schedules of duties.  Id. at 1491.  The words duty and tariff tend to be used interchangeably but the U.S. Constitution 
refers to duties but not tariffs.  U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 8, para. 1 delegates the power to impose taxes, duties, excises 
to Congress. 
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(or adjustments to existing taxes) to provide targeted funding for favored projects and 
incidentally to withhold funding from disfavored projects.  Each tax or adjustment comes with its 
own distributional characteristics.  Few if any taxes are progressive while many are regressive 
relative to wealth or resources of the taxpayer.   
A tax on alcoholic beverages is an example of a tax not designed primarily to raise revenue but 
to modify undesirable behavior.  Rather than prohibiting the behavior,21 the tax increases the cost 
to consumers of imbibing alcoholic beverages relative to other consumables.  Some consumers 
are likely to modify their behavior in response to the tax and purchase less alcohol because they 
lack funds to buy or are unwilling to devote so much of their resources to consumption. The tax 
can be targeted to discriminate among different types of alcoholic beverages22 depending on the 
legislature’s view of the degree of undesirability of the alcohol type.   
Except in the unlikely event that data on specific buying preferences of various social or 
economic groups in the society might enable a legislature to discriminate against or in favor of 
specific groups, an alcohol tax does not distinguish among consumers.  Since it is imposed at a 
flat rate possibly adjusted by the type of beverage, the tax adversely impacts a consumer with 
limited resources more than it does a consumer with abundant resources.  The tax is regressive 
and is more likely to deter undesirable behavior by those with limited rather than abundant 
resources. 23  However, the increased cost of the tax might stress households in which the 
individuals are unwilling or unable to modify their behavior and they redirect limited household 
resources to alcohol purchase.  Where the tax becomes too burdensome for most consumers, 
some may seek off market sources of the product that are less expensive.  Off market providers 
of the products do not collect and pay the tax either because they smuggle the products from a 
jurisdiction that does not impose the tax or imposes the tax at a lower rate, they steal the products 
or they manufacture the products in or distribute them from unmonitored and possibly higher 
health risk facilities as occurred during the period of prohibition in the U.S.  Because alcohol is 
addictive for some consumers, the tax may be responsible in part for collateral crime, as 
individuals seek to raise revenue to buy the product. 
21 Compare the failure of prohibition in the U.S.  U.S. Const. Amendment XVIII (1919) (prohibition) was repealed 
U.S. Const. Amendment XXI (1933). 
22 Börje Olsson, Hildigunnur Ólafsdóttir and Robin Room, Introduction: Nordic traditions of studying the impact of 
alcohol policies, Table 1. Some features of Nordic alcohol control systems in 2002 in Robin Room, ed. The Effects 
Of Nordic Alcohol Policies What Happens To Drinking And Harm When Alcohol Controls Change? NAD 
Publication No. 42 (Helsinki 2002) (available at http://www.dldocs.stir.ac.uk/documents/nad42.pdf) (showing tax 
differences for differing types of alcoholic beverages). 
23 Similarly, cigarette taxes that have limited success in reducing adult smoking but greater effect on children.  
Kevin Callison and Robert Kaestner, Do Higher Tobacco Taxes Reduce Adult Smoking? New Evidence of the 
Effect of Recent Cigarette Tax Increases on Adult Smoking, NBER Working Paper 18326 (2012) (accessed at 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w18326).  Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, RAISING CIGARETTE TAXES 
REDUCES SMOKING, ESPECIALLY AMONG KIDS (AND THE CIGARETTE COMPANIES KNOW IT) 
(accessed at https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/factsheets/0146.pdf).  
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An alcoholic beverage tax is not sustainable.  If successful in modifying behavior, as it has been 
in Scandinavia,24 it produces a diminishing revenue flow and, ideally results in its own 
obsolescence as alcohol consumption and possibly alcoholism diminish.   It is not a reliable 
source of long term revenue to support governmental provision of goods and services and it is 
not sustainable because it is regressive. 
Similarly, as an alternative to direct regulation of pollutants and polluting behaviors, legislatures 
have sought to use the tax administrative infrastructure to supplement or replace regulation.  
Environmental taxes, alongside direct regulation, hold promise in controlling environmental 
degradation but their success so far has been limited.   In the U.S., there are both federal and 
state fuel taxes.25  Fuel tax increases have some impact on consumption in the U.S.  As taxes and 
fuel prices rose following the 1973 oil crisis,26 demand increased for vehicles with improved fuel 
economy.  Yet, abundant and competitive oil production in recent years has stabilized fuel prices 
and even caused them to decline as consumers returned to less fuel efficient vehicle options.  
Consumers continue to purchase large and fuel inefficient vehicles.   
More direct use of the tax infrastructure to regulate fuel consumption and its accompanying 
pollution comes in the form of the federal gas guzzler tax that increases the cost of vehicles with 
low fuel efficiency ratings.27  Complementing the gas guzzler tax is a temporary credit for initial 
sales of electric vehicles.  The credit expires when the manufacturer reaches a certain level of 
production.28  The tax credit encourages development of electric vehicles. Nevertheless, 
alternative fuel efficient vehicles including hybrids that use gasoline and electricity and electric 
vehicles have found a limited market.  Electric vehicles have remained expensive even when the 
manufacturer passes the tax credit subsidy on to the consumer.  The vehicles are out of economic 
reach for the great bulk of the populace.  For others the limited availability of facilities and the 
time necessary for charging batteries have undermined broad acceptance of electric vehicles for 
those who have the resources to acquire them.  Direct fuel efficiency regulation for vehicles has 
served as a passive control on fuel consumption alongside increased taxes.   
The impact of fuel efficiency standards and tax incentives and disincentives tends to be 
regressive relative to resources.  Lower income taxpayers often buy the vehicles that higher 
income taxpayers relinquish and hold vehicles in service longer than higher income taxpayers 
24 Randy W. Elder, PhD, Briana Lawrence, MPH, Aneeqah Ferguson, MPA et al., The Effectiveness of Tax Policy 
Interventions for Reducing Excessive Alcohol Consumption and Related Harms, 38 American Journal of Preventive 
Medicine 217 (2010) (finding reverse correlation between price and consumption of alcohol but correlation is 
weaker as disposable income increases). 
25 American Petroleum Institute, State Motor Fuel Taxes:  Notes Summary Rates Effective 01/01/2019 (available at 
https://www.api.org/~/media/Files/Statistics/State-Motor-Fuel-Notes-Summary-January-19.pdf) (showing both state 
by state rates and combined with federal taxes).  States tend to dedicate fuel taxes to road maintenance and 
construction. 
26 U.S. Dept. of State, Office of the Historian, Oil Embargo, 1973–1974 (available at 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/oil-embargo).  
27 I.R.C. §4064 (excise tax on sale my manufacturer of low fuel economy vehicles). 
28 I.R.C. §30D (plug-in vehicle credit). 
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who can replace their vehicles in favor of better fuel economy so that the lower income taxpayers 
bear the heaviest burden of fuel tax increases and general price advances.  There have been no 
incentives to enable low income individuals to acquire fuel efficient vehicles while for many a 
car is essential to enable them to work because of a dearth of practical mass transit options.  The 
U.S. has been slow to develop affordable and widely available mass transit.  Where high 
efficiency mass transit becomes available demand for housing near the transit causes housing 
prices to rise.  Higher housing costs exclude lower income individuals from access to that mass 
transit.  
Part II.  Income tax infrastructure and non-tax purposes.  The preceding part of this paper 
illustrates the range of purposes for which the legislature has used the tax infrastructure.   Rather 
than considering delivery of any subsidy directly or controlling undesirable behavior with a 
direct enforcement mechanism, Congress automatically seems to turn to the income tax to 
deliver the subsidy with an exclusion from tax,29 a deduction30 or a credit31 or deters undesirable 
behavior with a tax32 or the denial of a deduction.33  Many people find the income tax to be 
complex and intimidating.  Some leading scholars have offered thoughtful recommendations to 
eliminate part of that complexity by removing the requirement that all taxpayers engage with the 
income tax directly.  Michael Graetz recommends eliminating the return filing requirement for 
most taxpayers.34  Joseph Bankman has been a proponent for initial return preparation by the tax 
agency rather than the taxpayer.35  Over the years, politicians have offered proposals to make the 
federal income tax return post card sized with only a line or two to fill.36  Rather than 
simplification, however, tax legislation tends to make taxing more complex both in its detail and 
by adding taxes to address specific revenue, political or social needs.  As the number of taxes 
grows, it becomes more difficult to determine which taxpayers are paying which taxes and what 
their overall tax burden may be.  When taxes deliver subsidies, tax planners often misdirect part 
of the subsidy to taxpayers who are not the subsidy target.37
Tax-based subsidies for specific investments sacrifice full use of the intended subsidy in the 
subsidized activity in exchange for the simplicity of an existing administrative mechanism.  Tax 
planning generates deadweight loss as the tax planners seize a portion of the subsidy as they 
29 I.R.C. §103, supra note 13 and accompanying text (subsidy to state and local governments through exclusion of 
interest payments from lenders’ incomes).
30 I.R.C. §168, supra note 16 and accompanying text (accelerated depreciation allowance). 
31 I.R.C. §30D, supra note 28 (plug-in vehicle credit). 
32 I.R.C. §4064, supra note 27 (gas guzzler excise tax). 
33 I.R.C. §280E (denying a deduction for business expenses associated with dealing in controlled substances). 
34 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Simple, Fair, and Competitive Tax Plan for the United States (New Haven, 
2010). 
35 For example, Joseph Bankman, Simple Filing for Average Citizens: the California Ready Return, 107 Tax Notes 
1431 (2005). 
36 Richard A. Gephardt (Dem. MO) touted such a return in his unsuccessful presidential campaign of 1988 and the 
notion resurfaced in conjunction with the TCJA in 2017, supra note 11. 
37 The tax shelter industry in the U.S. exemplifies this phenomenon. Ordower, Culture of Tax Avoidance, supra note 
1 at 55. 
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structure investments to comply with tax subsidy requirements while possibly not embracing the 
underlying objective of the subsidy.38 Recently when New York City required that new 
residential developments have a specific portion of lower income, “affordable” rental units as a 
condition to receiving certain tax benefits, some developers designed the project with separate 
entrances and facilities to segregate the low income tenants from the market rate tenants to make 
the higher market rental units more desirable, New York City changed the tax subsidy law to 
prohibit the practice prospectively.39
III. Broad tax bases for a sustainable tax.  A modern government cannot collect all its revenue 
from its wealthiest taxpayers even if it were committed to redistribution under progressive taxes.  
As Professor Sven-Olof Lodin argued in 1977, with only some ten percent of the population in 
1973 earning income greater than SEK 40,000,40 the bulk of government revenue must come 
from lower and moderate income groups.41  Professor Lodin concluded that the form of tax used 
to raise the revenue from the low to moderate income population might be of no significance.42
Lodin acknowledged, however, that “the heavy taxation of the low-income-receivers would 
probably not have been psychologically possible if the taxation of the higher incomes had not 
been made even more severe.”43  Consistent with that view of the necessity of taxing high 
incomes severely was the commonly held view through much of the 20th century that the tax 
system should not favor income from capital over income from labor.44 The image of “the idle 
rich” was commonplace.  Estate or inheritance taxes enjoyed some, albeit limited, success in 
preventing the accumulation and transmission of vast, dynastic, accumulated wealth although 
increasingly aggressive tax planning undercut the effectiveness of those taxes.45
Much has changed both in Sweden and the U.S. since that time.  Capital and its owners have 
captured tax legislation.  Any negative image of the “idle rich” as exploiters of labor transmuted 
38 Klaus-Dieter Drüen, Unternehmerfreiheit und Steuerumgehung [Entrepreneurial Freedom and Tax Avoidance], 
2008 Steuer Und Wirtschaft [STUW] 154, 158, observed: "Steuerumgehung volkswirtschaftlich betrachtet den 
Wettbewerb und führt zur ineffizienten Allokation von Ressourcen, weil beträchtliches Personal in Unternehmen, 
Steuerberatung und Staat fern von wirtschaftlicher Nutzenmaximierung gebunden wird.") ["From an economic 
perspective, tax avoidance disrupts competition and leads to inefficient allocation of resources as considerable 
personnel in business, tax planning industries, and the state remain far from economic production maximization 
activity." (author's translation). 
39 Melkorka Licea, ‘Poor door’ tenants of luxury tower reveal the financial apartheid within, The New York Post 
(January 17, 2016), accessed at https://nypost.com/2016/01/17/poor-door-tenants-reveal-luxury-towers-financial-
apartheid/.  
40 Sven-Olof Lodin, Swedish Tax Reforms 1071-77 – Why So Many?, 56 Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis Studia 
Juridica Stockholmiensia 181-2 (1977). 
41 Id. at 183. 
42 Id. Lodin’s study mentions the role employer taxes play in the adjustment of income tax rates but neither 
identifies the inverse relationship between employer taxes and wages nor the distributional effects of increasing 
value added taxes.  
43 Id. 
44 Andrew W. Mellon, TAXATION: THE PEOPLE’S BUSINESS 56-8 (New York 1924).
45 Ordower, Culture of Tax Avoidance, supra note 1 at 69-70. 
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to a myth.46  The wealthy have transformed into job creators and assumed the role of the drivers 
of production and growth.  Without the productive wealthy members of society, the country 
would not thrive.47   That argument has favored reducing regulatory and tax burdens on the 
wealthy to enable them to use their resources more effectively to create jobs and stimulate 
economic growth.  Simultaneously, capital mobility has undercut any lingering commitment to 
taxing labor more lightly than capital.  Labor is relatively immobile and easy to tax.  National 
borders, family ties, cultural barriers and costs of relocation have left labor as a fungible, 
predictable and measurable tax object. In advanced economies even if existing labor were to 
emigrate, immigration demand quickly would replace the lost labor as immigrants from less 
affluent countries seek the higher wages in the advanced economies. Robust tax competition 
among jurisdictions has fueled a bidding war for capital and made capital difficult to tax.48   Ease 
of communication and transportation over large distances through technological improvement 
and development of stable legal and financial systems in many previously difficult to access, low 
tax jurisdictions have become more attractive to those with the means to move their capital and 
sometimes themselves without giving up many of their ties to their home countries.    
During the final decades of the 20th and first decades of the 21st centuries, taxes on capital and 
capital investment have declined while relationally taxes on labor have increased in the U.S. and 
other economically advanced countries, Sweden included.  Opportunities to defer or permanently 
exclude capital income from taxation abound.  Estate, gift and wealth49 taxes have declined or 
disappeared.50  Consumption taxes and wage taxes carry larger shares of the governmental 
revenue burden.  This shift of tax burdens from capital to labor is the focus of this part.   
Estate, gift and wealth taxes all historically used progressive tax rates and fell largely on the 
wealthy.  Gift taxes remain within the control of the donor. If intrusively high, gift taxes interfere 
with the normal practice of gift giving from wealthier to less wealthy individuals – ordinary 
behavior within families -- potential donors simply may choose not to make gifts.  The U.S. 
sought to limit the impact of the gift tax on day-to-day small gifts with an annual per donor/per 
46 Morgan Stanley Wealth Management, The Myth of the “Idle Rich” (2015), accessed at:  
https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/myth-of-the-idle-rich (reporting on a survey of ultra-wealthy individuals with 
inherited wealth who are productive and altruistic). 
47 The theme of Ayn Rand’s novel Atlas Shrugged (1957) (in which the industrialists avenge efforts to regulate them 
by dropping out of the society, creating their own, and leaving the rest of the U.S. to decay) seems to prevail.  
48 Competition for capital among state and local jurisdictions in the U.S., for example, has magnified the bargaining 
power of major industrial interests.  Karen Weise, Manny Fernandez and John Eligon, Amazon’s Hard Bargain 




49 Limited wealth taxes are common in the U.S. at state or local level and imposed on real property and vehicles but 
personal property taxes on other property for which there is no government registry have not been successful.  
50 Sweden repealed its inheritance tax in 2003 and its wealth tax in 2007.  The U.S. had no wealth tax and reduced 
the maximum estate tax rate to 35 percent from 70 percent and now taxes estates only in excess of $10 million rather 
than the earlier $600,000. 
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donee exclusion.51  The primary role of a gift tax remains as a backstop to the estate or 
inheritance tax. 
Estate and inheritance taxes are more difficult to avoid than gift taxes.52  Death is actuarially 
predictable so that the taxes can provide a reasonably steady revenue stream. Exemptions for 
some property passing to surviving spouses and dependent children are essential lest families 
losing a breadwinner be left without sufficient economic resources so the taxes primarily affect 
wealthier taxpayers.  With current concentrations of wealth in economically advanced societies, 
an estate or inheritance tax might reach most of that concentrated wealth and produce adequate 
revenue to fund governmental needs if the tax rates are sufficiently high.  Political attacks on the 
estate tax have been relentless over the past decades and have included valuation litigation in 
several countries resulting in court orders to legislatures to cure valuation deficiencies of the 
estate tax.53  In the U.S., wealthy taxpayers, frequently providing “dark money,”54 engage in 
extensive publicity to characterize the tax pejoratively as an inherently unfair “death” tax 
threatening every taxpayer’s ability to pass a business or farm to his or her heirs.  The rhetoric 
persuaded many middle and lower income taxpayers to vote against their economic interests and 
support repeal of the estate tax even though most never would become subject to the tax.55
Extensive lobbying accompanied the publicity.  While not a complete success in the U.S., the 
U.S. has reduced the incidence of the tax and Sweden repealed it.56
Incidence of a consumption tax whether as a value added tax, sales tax, turnover tax, or other 
manifestation falls largely on middle and lower income taxpayers who consume all or almost all 
of their resources to meet their daily expenses.  If the tax base includes goods, services and real 
and personal property rentals, the consumption tax reaches nearly all the income of low and 
moderate income individuals who must consume all their resources.  Higher income taxpayers 
are likely to save and invest a portion of their resources so that even if there were a broad 
financial transactions tax embedded into or complementary to the consumption tax,57 the growth 
in resources as investments appreciate in value would not become subject to the consumption 
51 I.R.C. §2503 (the annual exclusion of $3000 of gifts per donor/per donee increased to $10,000 and became 
inflation adjusted). 
52 Charitable testamentary gifts are deductible from the estate in full.  I.R.C. §2055.  And in blank (case citation), the 
decedent avoided inclusion of an automobile in his estate when his will directed his burial in the car so that it did not 
pass to anyone and was not taxable as part of the estate.  
53 Germany and Sweden. 
54 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that restrictions on political 
expenditures by organizations is not permissible and the organizations need not disclose their donors).  The decision 
permits large contributions to organizations for political use without transparency, hence “dark money.”
55 Ordower, Culture of Tax Avoidance, supra note 1 at 117. 
56 Supra, note 50. 
57 See, generally, Leonard E. Burman, William G. Gale, Sarah Gault, Bryan Kim, Jim Nunns, and Steve Rosenthal, 
Financial Transaction Taxes in Theory and Practice, 69 Nat’l. Tax J. 171 (2016) (accessed at 
https://ntanet.org/NTJ/69/1/ntj-v69n01p171-216-financial-transaction-taxes-theory-practice.pdf?v=%CE%B1).  
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tax.  Recent efforts in several jurisdictions to enact a financial transactions tax have proven 
difficult and industry resistance to the tax strong.58
Consumption taxes for moderate and low income taxpayers are attractive because they are 
administratively efficient.  They are relatively easy to collect because the vendor or service 
provider collects the tax along with payment for the goods or services and remits the tax to the 
tax collector.59  A purchaser who lacks liquidity to pay the tax cannot acquire the item taxed.  
Unlike income and wealth taxes little or no self-reporting is necessary.  The recent U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.60 eliminated much of the self-reporting in state 
sales and use taxes in the U.S. by permitting states to require out of state vendors to collect and 
remit use taxes on sales to residents of states into which the vendor will ship goods.   
Consumption taxes tend to be regressive relative to the taxpayers’ resources. While consumption 
taxes raise revenue from the bulk of the population as is essential to sustain government goods 
and services,61 the tax leaves concentration of resources and resource growth intact and violates 
longstanding principles of distributional fairness in taxation. Some commentators have sought to 
design a progressive consumption tax but progression is narrow affecting only those who 
consume goods and services subject to a consumption tax and not those who consume little 
relative to their resources but have stores of wealth.  Proposals for a progressive consumption tax 
seek to promote savings – a worthy objective for middle and moderate income taxpayers -- but 
an objective that has led to concentration of wealth rather than taxation based on any ability to 
pay principle. Consumption taxes meet some but not all sustainability criteria and do not offer 
sustainable taxation. 
The income tax also has a broad base and the potential to raise adequate revenue for government 
alone or in conjunction with other taxes.  Existing income taxes lack the collection efficiency of 
consumption taxes because they often rely heavily on self-reporting except as they apply to wage 
earners where withholding provides comparable third party collection and remittance.62  For low, 
moderate, and many other middle income taxpayers, wages are the taxpayer’s primary source of 
income.  For those taxpayers, withholding is effective to collect the income tax.  For self-
employed taxpayers and taxpayers with significant income from investment capital, withholding 
misses the mark but could be made more robust.  By substituting a withholding obligation for 
58 For example, Tim Worstall, How Many Times Must We Say This? A Financial Transactions Tax Raises No 
Revenue, Forbes (Aug 28, 2017), accessed at https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2017/08/28/how-many-
times-must-we-say-this-a-financial-transactions-tax-raises-no-revenue/#634d61291a7b.  
59 Considerable tax fraud is present even within value added taxes.  Richard Thompson Ainsworth, Carousel Fraud 
in the EU: A Digital Vat Solution, TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 443 (MAY 1, 2006). Kiel Institute for World 
Economy, The EU Runs a Large Trade Surplus with Itself – One Reason Is Apparently Large-Scale VAT Fraud,
TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL (January 9, 2020) available at https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-
international/value-added-tax/german-research-institute-analysis-notes-eu-vat-
fraud/2020/01/08/2brj9?highlight=vat%20fraud. 
60 585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2080; 201 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2018). 
61 Lodin, Swedish Tax Reforms, supra note 40. 
62 I.R.C. §3402 (withholding on wages at source).  I.R.C. §31 (credit for wage withholding). 
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existing information reporting,63 an income tax could approximate the third party collection 
efficiency of a consumption tax.  
Most jurisdictions overlay income taxes with a consumption tax64 and often with specialty 
taxes65 and taxes on parts of taxpayer wealth.66  Taxes on capital, income from capital and 
increases in the value of capital have remained stagnant or moderated as taxes disproportionally 
affecting middle, moderate and low income taxpayers proliferate. This recurring theme of 
shifting tax burdens from capital to labor seems unlikely to remain sustainable as it segregates 
those with accumulated wealth from those with little or no capital.  The standard of living in 
advanced economies for the bulk of the population has improved over the centuries but the hope 
of becoming wealthy may be less attainable than it was when capital was not so concentrated. A 
tax system that supports concentrating wealth is distributionally unsustainable especially in the 
absence of a strong welfare state that provides some redistribution of wealth through extensive 
governmental benefits even if only within income classes.67
U.S. distribution of tax burdens under the income taxe skews in favor of higher income taxpayers 
relative to the mid-20th century income tax.  Capital gain continues to enjoy favored treatment.68
In the 1960s, for example, the maximum rate of tax on ordinary income was seventy percent.69
Congress assumed that the high rate of tax led many highly compensated and self-employed 
individuals to seek investment opportunities generating deductible tax losses.70 The investments 
were commonly referred to and marketed as “tax shelters.”  In early years of the investment, tax 
shelters generated deductible losses taxpayers could use to offset their income from performance 
of services and reduce their current tax burden.  Shelters generally offered tax deferrals rather 
than exclusions.  After a number of years the tax shelters would produce taxable income without 
cash with which to pay the tax, but the taxpayer could invest and retain the earnings on the 
63 I.R.C. §6401(payments in excess of $600); I.R.C. §6041A (wages and payments for services; I.R.C. §6042 
(dividends); I.R.C. §6045 (brokers); I.R.C. §6049 (interest). 
64 Imposed at state and local level in the U.S. by most states. 
65 Alcoholic beverages, tobacco, gasoline, for example. 
66 State or local property taxes in the U.S. 
67 A common characterization of Scandinavian welfare systems. 
68 This paper refers to capital gain imprecisely.  A capital gain is gain from the sale or exchange of any capital asset 
as defined under I.R.C. §1221 to include all property not within one of the exceptions in I.R.C. §1221. Net capital 
gain under I.R.C. §1222(11) is the income which receives favorable treatment.  Historically, non-corporate 
taxpayers received a deduction for fifty or sixty percent of their net capital gains but currently net capital gains are 
taxed at a lower rate than other income for most taxpayers under I.R.C. §1(h).  Net capital gain is the excess of net 
long term capital gain (I.R.C. §1222(7)) over net short term capital loss (I.R.C. §1222(6)).  Net long term capital 
gain is long term capital gains (I.R.C. §1222(3)) less long term capital losses (I.R.C. §1222(4)) during a year with 
long term meaning that the taxpayer has held the property for more than one year before selling it. Other capital 
gains are short term so net short term capital loss is short term capital losses (I.R.C. §1222(2))  – short term capital 
gains (I.R.C. §1222(1)). 
69 I.R.C. §1, as in effect until 1970. 
70 Decreasing rates of tax have not staunched taxpayers’ urge to avoid taxes.  Many designer tax shelters of the 
1980s and 1990s like the “son-of-boss” transactions sought to avoid payment of favored capital gain. A presidential 
candidate John Edwards is representative of taxpayers who sought to avoid a 2.9 percent Medicare tax on income 
from services.  Ordower, Culture of Tax Avoidance, supra note 1 at 82-8. 
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deferred tax liability generated in the early investment years.71  In 1969 Congress reduced the 
maximum rate of tax on income from services to fifty percent while retaining a seventy percent 
rate maximum for investment income.72  The rate split favoring income from services reduced 
tax shelter investments somewhat since a tax shelter would defer fifty percent tax but would 
require a payment of seventy percent tax when the shelter began to produce taxable income.73
In 1981, however, Congress eliminated the rate split by reducing the maximum rate on 
investment income to fifty percent.74  A further maximum rate reduction in 1987 to 28 percent75
included the short-lived elimination of a rate preference for capital gain.  High income taxpayers 
with significant income from invested capital experienced a maximum rate reduction of 42 
percent with an eight percent increase in the tax on their capital gains.  With many ways to 
control the timing of the inclusion of capital gains in income, the rate reductions benefitted 
higher income taxpayers significantly.  Maximum rates have increased and the maximum rate on 
capital gain decreased since 1986.   
The second portion of the income tax is separate from the general computation of taxable income 
and affects only income from the performance of services.  The social security tax and its 
complementary self-employment tax have their origins in the social security retirement 
program.76  Collection of retirement benefits under social security requires that the individual has 
paid social security taxes rather than falling into one of the exempt categories of workers.77
There is no immediate correlation between tax payments and the amount and duration of the 
benefits.  The tax is a wage income tax and its collections become part of general revenue 
through a system of internal accounting transfers credited with interest.  The tax has only two 
rate brackets, a positive rate and a zero rate.78  The positive rate applies to services income up to 
a limit.79 Service income in excess of that limit is not subject to the tax nor is income from 
capital.  Thus the tax favors higher income taxpayers and all taxpayers to the extent of their 
income from capital and most who own significant sums of income producing capital are 
affluent.  Relative to resources the tax is regressive and distributionally not sustainable. 
71 Id. at .   
72 Lawrence B. Lindsey, Is the Maximum Tax on Earned Income Effective?, NBER Working Paper No. 613 (1981) 
(accessed at https://www.nber.org/papers/w0613.pdf ) (arguing that the split tax leaves much earned income taxable 
at the same rates as investment income). When a shelter burned out and began producing income without cash, 
many investors simply failed to report the income. 
73 Emil Sunley, “The Maximum Tax on Earned Income,” 27 Nat’l. Tax J. 543 (1974).  Traditional tax shelter 
investments did not lose their attractiveness until many years later when the maximum income tax rate declined to 
28 percent and the passive activity loss limitations under I.R.C. §469, added by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 
86), required matching of tax deductible losses to economic losses. 
74 Economic Recovery Act of 1981, supra note 16. 
75 Tax Reform Act of 1986, P.L. 99-514 (Oct 22, 1986).  Be.cause of a phase out of the marginal rate brackets at 
higher income levels by adding an additional tax, there was a 33 percent rate bubble within a specific income range.  
76 SSA, RETIREMENT BENEFITS available at https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10035.pdf
77 I.R.C. §3121(b) excludes certain employment such as federal judges, the president and vice president.  
78 I.R.C. §3101 (wage tax); I.R.C. §1401 (self-employment tax). 
79 The cap on the tax is set under section 230 of the Social Security Act and for 2020 is $137,700. 
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Performing services as an employee is a trade or business.80  Yet, the tax law disfavors employee 
business expenses relative to other business expenses.  It excludes employee business expenses 
from classification as deductible adjustments to gross income.81  Instead employee business 
expenses are itemized deductions82 and miscellaneous itemized deductions83 subject to two 
limitations on deductibility. As miscellaneous itemized deductions, they are not deductible until 
2026.  When they become deductible, they are itemized deduction if they exceed two percent of 
the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.84  As itemized deductions, they produce a tax benefit only 
if the taxpayer’s itemized deductions in the aggregate exceed the standard deduction.   
Further discriminating against labor relative to capital intensive businesses and some self-
employment is the new twenty percent deduction for qualified business income.85  The trade or 
business of performing services as an employee is expressly excluded from the deduction.86
Part IV.  The Capital Conundrum.   
Income from capital including both periodic income such as interest, dividends, rents, and 
royalties, and gain from the disposition of property is not subject to the social security portion of 
the income tax.87  In several respects U.S. tax law further favors each type of income from 
capital.   
Periodic Income.  Since 2001 dividends from domestic corporations are subject to a reduced rate 
of tax.88  The reduced rate ameliorates the impact of a shareholder level tax following on a 
corporate level tax often referred to as double taxation of corporate profits.  The recent reduction 
in the corporate tax rate to 21 percent89 undercuts that double taxation argument in that currently 
the combined tax on a corporation distributing all its after tax income to non-corporate 
shareholders is currently lower than the maximum rate of tax on income from other sources 
including specified service business income.90  Income from an unincorporated, capital intensive 
trade or business yields a twenty percent deduction for qualified business income.91  To the 
extent a business places depreciable personal property into service, it receives an immediate 
80 I.R.C. §62(a)(1). 
81 Id.  Generally referred to as above-the-line deductions that always produce a tax benefit. 
82 I.R.C. §63. 
83 I.R.C. §67.   Suspension of deduction.  I.R.C. §67(g). 
84 I.R.C. §62. 
85 I.R.C. §199A added by the TCJA, supra note 11.  I.R.C. §199A(d)(1)(A)  (excludes specified service business 
income from professional services (medicine, law, architecture, accounting, etc.) in excess of certain thresholds). 
86 I.R.C. §199A(d)(1) (B). 
87 Supra note 78, a 12.4 percent tax on gross wages and self-employment income with a cap. 
88 I.R.C. §1(h)(11) (imposing a maximum rate of 20 percent).  The statement oversimplifies the rate preference.  The 
rate preference applies to foreign corporations that have U.S. source income.  In addition corporate shareholders 
receiving dividends from other corporations may deduct some or the entire amount of the dividend.  I.R.C. §243, 
245A. 
89 I.R.C. §11, as amended by TCJA. 
90 That is 21 percent corporate tax followed by a 20 percent individual tax on the 79 percent remaining --  a total of 
36.8 percent.  I.R.C. §199A(d)(1)(A), supra note 85, legal services, for example.   
91 I.R.C. §199A. 
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deduction for the cost of the depreciable property under the current bonus depreciation rules92 – a 
significant timing advantage over other depreciation methods. 
Capital Gain.  The U.S. income tax gives capital gain a position of privilege and protection that it 
has enjoyed consistently and, except for that brief period after 1986, a preferred rate structure.93
Even that period when the maximum rate applicable to capital gain was equal to that applicable 
to other income, the realization requirement for inclusion of capital gain in income94 left the 
timing of inclusion within the control of the taxpayer while income from services was periodic 
and immediately includable.  Capital can be preserved and increased without significant 
interference from tax but taxes retard the initial accumulation for those without capital by 
diminishing net disposable income from services that one might invest in capital. 
One powerful privilege of capital is that appreciated property which would generate capital gain 
if sold during a taxpayer’s lifetime95 is no longer taxable, except to the extent of post-death 
appreciation in value, if sold following the taxpayer’s death.  This disappearance of capital gain 
occurs because the decedent’s adjusted basis in all the decedent’s property changes to the fair 
market value of the property on the date of the decedent’s death.96  This new adjusted basis at 
death rule motivates taxpayers to continue to hold property to get the new basis at death for the 
beneficiaries of their estates longer than they otherwise might do when, absent taxes, holding the 
property may not be the best economic choice for the property.  Instead of selling. taxpayers may 
monetize their property through borrowing secured by the property.  Borrowing is not a taxable 
event.   
Congress may have assumed that a preferential tax rate for capital gain would encourage 
taxpayers to sell when economically desirable to shift the property to its most productive use.  
Similarly, other special capital rules enable taxpayers to transfer property without incurring any 
incidence of taxation on the transfer.97  In some deferrals the property may be shifted to more 
productive use while gifts shift the incidence of capital gain taxation to the donee from the donor 
under whose ownership the property appreciated in value.  While shifting of income from capital 
92 I.R.C. §168(k)(1) (allowing a 100 percent depreciation allowance for most personal property until 2024 and then 
phase down to 80 percent, etc.). 
93 Supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
94 I.R.C. §1001. 
95 I.R.C. §1011 (adjusted basis is cost under I.R.C. §1012 plus or minus adjustments under I.R.C. §1016 
(depreciation allowances, for example)).  If a taxpayer’s amount realized (sale price) on the sale or exchange of 
property exceeds the taxpayer’s adjusted basis in the property, the excess is gain.  I.R.C. §1001.  Gain is includable 
in income unless a statute otherwise prevents inclusion. I.R.C. §1001(c). 
96 The excess of the amount realized over adjusted basis becomes zero as the adjusted basis becomes fair market 
value on date of death.  I.R.C. §1014. 
97 I.R.C. §1031 (like kind exchange of real property); I.R.C. §351 (transfer to a controlled corporation); I.R.C. §721 
(transfer to a partnership); I.R.C. §1015 (transfer by gift). 
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and capital gain to another taxpayer subject to a lower tax rate, for example, through a gift of the 
property is permitted,98 shifting income from the performance of services is not.99
Charitable gifts of property over which the donor may retain limited but indirect control do not 
trigger the recognition of gain from the disposition of the property.100  Yet, the donor receives a 
deduction for the charitable gift equal to the fair market value of the property on the date of the 
gift.101 The deduction reduces the donor’s taxable income from other sources by the value of the 
donated property.  The resulting tax reduction is a tax-based subsidy of the charitable gift and the 
donor controls the expenditure of that amount of governmental revenue free from any 
governmental policy decision on expenditures.  The redirection of government revenue through 
the tax deduction may be fully contrary to current government expenditure policies but 
nevertheless available as long as the charitable donee meets the very general charitable recipient 
requirements.102  An individual without capital also may make deductible charitable 
contributions but in most cases of lower, moderate and middle income taxpayers, the charitable 
contribution deduction results in little or no tax savings because it generates a tax benefit only 
when the donor’s itemized deductions,103 including the charitable contribution deduction, exceed 
the standard deduction.104  Few taxpayers itemize deductions. 
The ability to defer inclusion of capital asset appreciation in income and the rate preference 
applicable to capital gain encourage extensive tax planning to convert what might be ordinary 
income into capital gain.  Congress repeatedly has enacted legislation to prevent conversion. For 
example, depreciation allowances on personal property are subject to recapture as ordinary 
income when the taxpayer disposes of the personal property.105  Nevertheless a much criticized 
opportunity to convert services income into capital gain remains available in the private equity 
98 The donor does not recognize gain from transferring property by gift.  See infra note 100.  The donee does not 
have income from the gift under I.R.C. §102 but does succeed to the donor’s adjusted basis in the property received.  
I.R.C. §1015 and built-in gain potential. 
99 Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) (holding that an assignment of income from services from one spouse to the 
other would not be valid for tax purposes).  Joint return filing rendered the issue moot by permitting general splitting 
of income between spouses.  I.R.C. §6013. 
100 No specific statutory authority exists for this proposition or for the non-recognition of gain by the donor of a non-
charitable gift.  Under the gain inclusion provision I.R.C. §1001, there is a disposition but the amount the donor 
realizes from the disposition is zero so that the donor’s adjusted basis always will be greater than or equal to the 
amount realized and theoretically would have a non-deductible loss under I.R.C. §165(c) (no deductible loss if the 
transaction was neither in a trade or business nor a transaction entered into for profit).  The donee succeeds to the 
donor’s adjusted basis so any built-in gain is preserved for recognition when the donee sells the property.  Sale by a 
charitable donee will not become taxable because the donee is exempt from tax.  I.R.C. §501. 
101 I.R.C. §170. 
102 I.R.C. §501(c)(3) (charitable purposes for organizations exempt from tax and permitted to receive deductible 
contributions including churches, educational institutions, civic groups among others). 
103 I.R.C. §63(d). 
104 I.R.C. §63(c) (an inflation adjusted $12,000 per taxpayer). 
105 I.R.C. §1245. 
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and to a lesser degree hedge fund industries,106 as investment managers receive a share of the 
profits of the fund in the form of an interest in the investment fund entity.  This “carried interest” 
is not taxable when received107 but as the manager receives a share of the profits, the tax 
transparency rules preserve the character of the income of the entity in the hands of the 
partners.108  In the case of a private equity fund, the income tends to be capital gain from the sale 
of the acquired corporate business. 
Changing the Base and the Conversation.  Why favor capital?  Capital receives favorable income 
tax treatment in many ways: deductions, rates, and timing.  Deductions and rates both go to the 
question of how much and timing goes to when and if.109  Elimination of both rate preferences 
and deferral would broaden the tax base considerably, generate the same revenue at lower 
marginal rates and would have a comparatively small impact on taxpayers with little property.  
Favorable treatment of capital gain when includable in income along with the ability of taxpayers 
to defer recognizing capital gains severely hampers the development of a comprehensive tax 
base.110
The rate preference for capital gain is a mainstay of the U.S. tax system.  The rate preference at 
one time may have ameliorated the effect of very high progressive tax rates on concentrated 
income.111 Current income tax rates have retreated considerably.112  Yet the preference for 
capital gain has endured and expanded to other income from capital.113  Professor Blum 
concluded in 1957 that the rate preference was unjustified as he cataloged the arguments.114  The 
validity of Blum’s arguments remains compelling.  The rate preference is not supportable under 
a sustainable tax system.  Income is income and the rate preference for capital discriminates 
against those who have little or no capital.  Inertia and political influence supported by the threat 
posed by capital mobility best explain the continuation of the capital gain preference.115
Arguments that reduced rates on capital gain prevent capital flight remain overstated.  Evidence 
has been to the contrary.  Concealment of capital offshore116 and expatriation to avoid taxes117 as 
well as corporate inversions to avoid the U.S. taxation of worldwide income118 seem unlikely to 
106 Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 NYU Law Rev.  
(2008), accessed at https://www.nyulawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/NYULawReview-83-1-
Fleischer.pdf.  
107 Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-27 C.B. 343. 
108 I.R.C. §702(b) (character and source of partnership allocations flow through to partners). 
109 See discussion of I.R.C. §1014 and new basis, supra, note 96 and accompanying text. 
110 Simons, Personal Income Taxation, supra note 5, at 50. 
111 Walter J. Blum, A Handy Summary of Capital Gains Arguments, 35 Taxes 247. 260 (1957). 
112 The maximum tax rate in the 1950s was 91 percent. 
113 Supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text. 
114 Blum, Handy Summary, supra note 111. 
115 Id. at 266. 
116 The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act has enjoyed some success in compelling U.S. taxpayers to report their 
offshore accounts. 
117 I.R.C. §877A (expatriation tax) includes all deferred gain and capital appreciation in income at the moment of 
expatriation.   
118 I.R.C. §7874 (continuation tax on expatriated entities). 
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stop even with rate reductions.119  There is little or no evidence that rate reduction correlates with 
job creation and a better economic life for all. 
Rate preferences for capital are only one aspect of the capital preference.   Elimination of the 
ability to escape tax on accumulated appreciation at death also is critical.  Whatever assumptions 
one once made about lack of records to support new basis at death rules no longer are valid.  
With respect to securities, brokers now are required to retain basis records for their clients.120
There no longer is a general rollover for personal residences121 so taxpayers selling a personal 
residence must report their gain when they sell and may exclude part of the gain but must have 
retained their records.122
Better would be the annual inclusion of appreciation and deduction of depreciation in the value 
of each taxpayer’s property.  Purging the realization requirement would yield a comprehensive 
income tax base and serve as a more complete measure of each taxpayer’s income.123  Valuation 
problems abound but not for property with an active trading market.  For other intangible 
investment property, self-interest of fund managers124 has developed reasonably accurate 
techniques for evaluating securities for which no trading market exists.  Data bases exist 
throughout the U.S. for real property values to facilitate assessment of ad valorem property 
taxation at local level.  Improvement and consolidation of those data bases and annual updates 
would not be a formidable task given advances in computer technology.  For other property, 
large data base management would become necessary but, once developed, a data base should be 
relatively straightforward to adjust for value changes.125  Certainly some income still would be 
excluded from the base although including imputed income from an owner’s use of her personal 
residence easily could become the next step in taxing capital once a national data base is in 
place.126
The recently enacted transition tax127 offers good insights into making the transition to a 
comprehensive base palatable.  Averaging the inclusion over several years, temporarily reducing 
the tax rate, and deferring payment in appropriate circumstances until an actual sale yields 
proceeds with which to pay the tax would all ease the transition to non-realization based 
119 The reduction of the corporate tax rate from 35 to 21 percent in 2018, I.R.C. §11, as amended by TCJA, and the 
corporate dividends received deduction for foreign source income of a foreign subsidiary may reduce the push for 
corporate inversions.  However, the combination of the base erosion tax under I.R.C. §59A and the inclusion of 
global intangible low-taxed income under I.R.C. §951A may offset that effect. 
120 I.R.C. §6045(g). 
121 I.R.C. §1034 before repeal in 1997. 
122 I.R.C. §121 (limited gain exclusion).  
123 Henry C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation, supra note 5 at 50. 
124 Private equity and hedge funds in which the manager’s compensation depends on the advance in value.
125 Possibly even to the tax collector reporting value to the taxpayer annually under a system that might warm Joseph 
Bankman’s heart, supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
126 Henry Ordower, Income Imputation:  Toward Equal Treatment of Renters and Owners in Anthony C. Infanti, ed., 
Controversies in Tax Law: A Matter of Perspective (Ashgate Press, 2015). 
127 I.R.C. §965, added by TCJA (requiring 10 percent shareholders of foreign corporations to include their shares of 
accumulated foreign income in 2018). 
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taxation.128  The transition tax also dispels any lingering doubts concerning realization as a 
constitutional requirement as it follows on an uneven flow of income without realization statutes, 
foreign personal holding companies,129 mark-to-market for certain investment property,130
positions held by securities dealers,131 expatriation as a taxable event,132 but approaches the facts 
of the Eisner v. Macomber133decision that required realization as a condition to inclusion in 
taxable income. 
Part V.  Conclusion -- A single sustainable income tax.  Following transition to this 
comprehensive tax base, integration of the three separate elements of the income tax into a single 
tax is the final step.  The comprehensive base and elimination of rate preferences integrates 
taxation of capital with taxation of other income.  The social security tax is the third element.  
Continuation of separate base for the social security tax no longer remains compelling.  There is 
precedent for grafting what once was a wage tax onto a much broader base to include investment 
income when revenue was needed to fund a more comprehensive health insurance system.134
Following that restructuring, integration of the three elements would simplify the income tax 
greatly, make the income tax treatment of all taxpayers comparable and even-handed, and treat 
all income equally for all purposes.  Even if the transition were accompanied by further 
flattening of rates,135 use of a single base would be simpler, distributionally fairer and more 
transparent than the existing income tax.  The tax would meet all the requirements for 
sustainability and would remain sustainable once established if the legislature would use the tax 
infrastructure only for revenue purposes and create a new and transparent administrative 
infrastructure to deliver subsidies and advance non-revenue related policies. 
128 Henry Ordower, Abandoning Realization and the Transition Tax: Toward a Comprehensive Tax Base, 67 Buffalo 
L. Rev. (forthcoming, 2019) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3273098).  
129 I.R.C. §551 (repealed 2004). 
130 I.R.C. §1256. 
131 I..R.C. §475. 
132 I.R.C. §877A. 
133 252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
134 I.R.C. §1411 added by the Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111–152  (Mar. 30, 2010). 
135 The rate system would have at least two brackets – a zero bracket and a positive bracket – as there would be 
some individuals with small incomes who should not be taxed at all. 
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